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Abstract 
The well-known criminal justice constituencies of crime control, due process and penal sentence are facing far 
reaching transformations resulting in some paradoxical outcomes that include an upsurge in populist legislations 
and the emergence of non-state actors in justice administration. Although these may be reflections of criminal 
justice’s attempt to enhance effectiveness, the outcome has been severely convoluted that the question of rights 
and even the foundation of theory of social contract are waning into the shadows of bureaucratic policies and 
practices that seemed to threaten the fabric of justice administration. This paper is an attempt to show how 
criminal justice policies and strategies are gravitating from their orthodox constituency to a territory that is 
mixed in populism, punitivism as well as the compounded regime of coalitions of public and private actors 
defined mostly by contentious new practices of crime control, procedural changes and an economic way of 
thinking, leading to unconventional and often controversial practices.   
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1.0 Introduction 
In socio-legal literature, the concept of criminal justice and what it intends to achieve has always been a 
contentious and changing phenomenon (Foucault, 1975; Shapiro, 1986; Garland, 1991: 2002; Ashworth, 2002; 
Samaha, 2005). The history of dynamic constituency of social contract has continued to develop in a climate that 
is filled with multifaceted relationships between “criminal justice, social order and the State” (Uglow, 1984: 75). 
Amidst this came the growing pessimism in the ability of the institution of criminal justice’s to actually control 
crime or even reduce recidivism.  Hence, the constant, often populist exaggeration on the need for tougher 
measures which is now leading to superficial analysis and punitive standpoints on how to deal with crimes and 
social disorder (Feeley, 1982: 388), leading to wavering practices that are not always rational (Burke, 2012: 3). 
From the last quarter of the 21st century, debate on the three prominent constituencies of criminal justice has seen 
the proliferation of new ideals and actors. The field of crime control, dues process and penal sentence have 
transformed, especially with the growing populist and punitive legislations, the emergence of non-state actors in 
the field of crime control and indeed the proliferation of inconsistent practices such as plea bargaining. By far, 
these are a reflection of the unstable history of criminal justice reforms and policies that have now led to series 
of questions of the whole idea of justice and the rule of law. 
 
2.0 A Paradigm Shift in Policy and Strategy 
The intricates of the growing complex paradigm in criminal justice policies and strategies has, no doubt resulted 
in severe institutional and policy contours. In many cases, the justice system was seen to gravitate towards a new 
direction in ideas that are historically within the exclusive prerogative of the state such as crime prevention and 
even prisons are now shared by both public and private sectors (Garland, 2001: 176), while the correctionalistic 
optimism that emerged with ideas such as rehabilitation seemed to be disappearing into the shadows. Hence, the 
contention that criminal justice has become a compounded regime of coalitions of public and private actors 
(Burke, 2012: 117). This justifies the argument that the institution of criminal justice, today, is more of an 
embodiment of a reworked conception defined by a new criminology of control, and an economic thinking in 
both the key areas of policy and practice (Garland, 2001: 3). Unsurprisingly, these structural transformations are 
driven by many factors, including the admission, in many jurisdictions of how every criminal justice strategy has 
failed to stop crime (ibid: 106-175). The outcome of this pessimistic view has, to a larger extent led to a 
reworked pattern and emotional sensibility that now drives crime control agencies to invoke alternatives that are 
often controversial such as the increased use of new methods of surveillance and violations of privacy as well as 
the emphasis on containment of incivility; all in the facade that the system must ensure safety and security 
(Burke, 2012: 201-202). In the end, the society becomes subjected to policies and situations that legitimise 
compromises and breaches of the ideals that the justice system was meant to protect in the first place. In theory, 
one of the most popular models of criminal justice proffered by Bottoms and McClean (1976) referred to as 
“liberal bureaucratic model” insists that the overriding function of criminal justice should not be the repression 
of criminal behaviour but the protection of individual liberty as well as the rights of the defendant. For that 
system to work, however, such protections must have limits and should not be allowed to be used frivolously 
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(Ibid: 229).  
Concerned about this political adventurism that continue to resonate in the justice system, proponents of 
procedural rights and civil liberties have become incessantly agitated, insisting that the field of justice 
administration must reclaim its status and ideals of protection of the citizen from impunity. This they argue is 
because insistence on crime control without recourse to the principality of due process only leads to an 
aggressive and belligerent policing. They argue that emphasis on due process is a key component of justice and 
the most potent safeguard restraints the excesses of officials, ensure the protection of individual rights, privacy 
and liberty.  
 
3.0 Crime Control 
As a model, crime control is mainly based on the proposition that the society must take stringent measures to 
protect the community from criminals. Although this approach is sometimes characterised by elements of 
repressiveness, the arguments for it are often sentimentally compelling. What has become of great concern in 
contemporary legal scholarships is the way this approach has steadily become synonymous with practices that 
are aggressive and even oppressive. In many regimes, the strategy to fight crime at all cost has culminated in a 
relaxed concern for civil liberties and the rights of offenders (Garland, 2001: 12). Also, there appears to be a 
gravitation towards an ‘actuarial’ approach that is characterised by intrusions on people and communities based 
on the sentiment and label of risk (Burke, 2012: 203). Examples of these can be found in motivations and 
practices such as preventive detention, mass surveillance and offender profiling (ibid). There is also the 
increasing attitude among crime control agencies in classifying and managing individuals or groups on the 
perception that they are a community who pose a greater risk or threat to the society (Feeley and Simons, 1994: 
180). Wilson, for instance, argues:  
“Wicked people exist; nothing avails except to set them apart from the innocent people. And many 
people, neither wicked nor innocent, but watchful, dissembling, and calculating of their chances, ponder 
our reaction to wickedness as a clue to what they might profitably do” (cited in Siegel, 2009: 24).  
While concern for civil liberties continue to grow, proponents of crime control argue that the public is 
always outraged by the conduct of criminals and therefore the legitimacy for an efficient and aggressive policing 
as well as tough sanctions (ibid: 24). They also insist that in the cause of crime prevention, it is justifiable to 
surrender certain individual rights for the collective good the whole community (ibid). For example, they argue 
that for the system to be effective, crime control agencies must be granted unhindered powers to embark upon 
patrols, surveillance, search and seizure, without the fear of any consequence of liability or charge (ibid).  
These propositions resonate with the current highly charged political environment that accentuates the need 
for harsher penalty for offenders, which according to Garland (2001) has turned government policy on crime 
more ‘populist’ and sentimental rather than rational opinions and advice of experts and practitioners. In order to 
assuage public concerns and gain political leverage, politicians have become used to making constant reference 
to the ‘victim’, the weak and the vulnerable (ibid: 173). The effect of this has been the crude politicisation of 
crime control policies, leading to the complexity that is now inherent in the structure of the relationship between 
policy decisions, legislation and judicial reforms that promote punitive dogma as against the insistence that the 
justice system should maintain fairness and reasoning (ibid). Another aspect that is of great concern to scholars 
is that the ‘crime control model’ tends to challenge the values of ‘process rights’, as it sometimes reject 
painstaking judicial scrutiny  associated with adversarial processes, on the bases that such scrutiny accord the 
guilty an undeserved opportunity to escape liability, thereby undermining the criminal justice system and making 
it appear unreliable in the protection of the victim and the society  (Sanders and Young, 1994: 14). As McBarnet 
opined: 
 “a wide range of prosecution evidence can be legally produced and presented, despite the rhetoric of a 
system geared overwhelmingly to safeguard the accused, precisely because legal structure, legal 
procedure, legal rulings, not legal rhetoric, govern the legitimate practice of criminal justice, and there 
is quite simply a distinct gap between the substance and the ideology of the law”. (1985: 155). 
Other proponents of the crime control model suggest that the augmentation of policing institutions and an 
intensified surveillance strategy play a significant role in crime prevention (Goffredson and Hirschi, 1990: 270: 
Klockars and Mastrofski, 1991: 537). It I however, important to note that many of these claims are dominated by 
a policing tactics by which target groups chosen in ways that promote a generalised judgement (Sherman, 1992: 
7-9). Hence, the society finds itself engulfed in stereotyping certain groups or communities. 
 
4.0 Due Process 
Unlike the emphasis of the crime control model for tougher and unhindered policing and conviction, the ‘due 
process’ model underscores the primacy of the rights of the individual and the limit of official powers (Sanders 
and Young, 1994: 16). This idea is firmly rooted in the broader conceptual framework of criminal justice’s 
jurisprudential compliance, which can be traced to the root of the social contract theory. Proponents of due 
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process maintain that the legitimacy of policing and the justice system is reliant on how much of the citizen’s 
rights of citizens is protected and the assurance that law enforcement agents can be held to account where they 
err (McCoville, 1998). Hence, any belligerence in crime control policies or strategies that subvert rights and civil 
liberties cannot be equated with fairness or democratic values. Some scholars also caution that due to the 
enormous powers of agencies of the State, the process of law enforcement must be cautious and guarded from 
any antagonism that may lead to indiscriminate arrests, coerciveness and any impropriety that will lead to breach 
of the rights of citizens or even to the conviction of the innocent (Sanders and Young, 1994: 16).  
Most of the proponents of ‘due process’ do not believe, as Wilson (1975) does, that individuals are innately 
inclined to commit crime. Rather, they consider the individual as a victim of a dynamic social structure and his 
criminal behaviour may, sometimes be the result of overwhelming social or psychological intricacies. Hence, no 
matter the sentiment about offenders, the community must first ensure that rights are protected from repressive 
behaviour of crime control agencies. In fact, the society is more protected and at ease from crime if the State 
gives emphasis to the basic needs of the people and not hardcore and brutal crime control approaches. Even the 
record rate of recidivism can be reduced through liberal measure such as restorative justice (Siegel, 2009: 26-29).  
Despite the common theoretical dichotomy between the crime control and the due process, criminal justice 
system is in practice characterised by both models, which operate together as part of an integral process. icch 
 
5.0 Penal Justice 
The idea of punishment has always been a distinctive hallmark of criminal justice since time immemorial 
(Zedner, 2004: 71). This act of subjecting an individual to some kind of pain, embarrassment or ridicule was 
anthropologically discovered to be part of human social relations long before the advent of what we today know 
as a bureaucratic society with an organised police force, and a hierarchical court and prison system (Zedner, 
2004: 71). Describing what punishment is, von Hirsch (1985) qualified it as an aspect of justice that serves as a 
censure and a means of conveying a message of blame to the offender, making him accountable for his 
wrongdoings. It is that measure of deterrence that threatens the individual with penal deprivation that expresses 
the ‘censure’ and serves as a prudential disincentive that deters crime. Although Hirsch thinks deterrence alone is 
not a sufficient reason for punishment, he maintains that it is necessary (Hirsch, cited in Bagaric 2001: 67). The 
most common classification of punishment by scholars are ‘retributivism’ which sees punishment as an end 
objective and believe everyman should be punished adequately for his crime, and ‘Utilitarianism’, which on the 
other hand is concerned with the future effects of punishment and therefore demands that punishment should be 
a means of achieving some wider and future societal objective (Hudson, 2004: 3-4). These groupings were 
represented by the popular theories of ‘retribution’ proposed by Kant (1724-1804) and those of Utilitarianism as 
expressed by Bentham (1748-1832) and Mill (1806-1873). While these two approaches remain the most 
common reasons and responses, it is unclear whether any of the two is effective in controlling or even reducing 
crime. 
In modern day criminal justice, punishment is mainly imposed upon a decision that stems from the authority 
of the State. For any suffering to be a ‘punishment’ it must be inflicted by those who have authority to do so 
(Easton and Piper, 2012: 4). Murphy (1970) explains the idea of punishment form the Kantian perspective 
retributivism which suggests that if the law is to remain fair and just, it is important to guarantee that offenders 
not gain an unfair advantage over those who do obey the law. Thus, and so punishment should be there to 
maintain a proper and legitimate balance between benefit and obedience. 
Although penal justice is arguably the most common response to crime (Clarkson, 2005: 6), there is little 
empirical evidence to suggests that it actually stops crime or reform the offender (Marsh, et al. 2004: 6). And of 
all the processes involved in the administration of justice, none is more controversial and neither has suffered 
vehement criticism as the idea, process and purpose of punishment (Golding, 1974: 69).  Custodial sentence, 
which is the most common form of criminal sentence in many parts of the world has failed to serve the goals of 
crime control or even the ideals of corrective justice. Hence, retribution is more about blameworthiness and 
culpability (Golding, 1974: 84), with an origin that is linked to the Roman ‘Lex Talionis’ (Zedner, 2004: 86). 
That was among the reasons why it continued to attract a great deal of scholarly debates and its operation is seen 
to have lately resonated in the form of ‘just desert’ (ibid.). The difference between ‘retribution’ and ‘desert’ 
however, is that the former sees punishment from the point of morality in that every offender deserves to be 
punished for his action, while the latter encourages punishment but emphasises that such punishment must be 
proportionate to the crime committed (Burke, 2012: 165-166). The debate on ‘proportionality’ has remained at 
the heart of criticism of the idea of ‘just desert’. Critics of ‘desert’ such as Easton and Piper (2012) argue that it 
is impossible to have a justice system in which every offender would be sentenced to a different form or degree 
of punishment believed to be exclusively proportionate to his offence, as this would invariably result in as many 
types of punishment as there are offenders and will make the system of punishment quite complex and 
inconsistent. 
Another famous theory in penal justice is the utilitarian theory, which views punishment as a means to 
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achieving an end, suggesting that punishment, or the fear of it is a measure in the deterrence of crime. Utilitarian 
ideologists view the offender as part of the larger society whose actions and omissions are inherently influenced 
by social factors and not just the simple impulse to commit crime. They criticise the retributivists approach as an 
oppressive culture that paves the way for punitive policies, which they associate with reactionary States (ibid: 
99). Other scholars also maintain that the essence and justification for punishment should be in its capacity to 
either deter the offender and the wider public, rehabilitate the offender or incapacitate those in incarceration from 
committing further offence (Ten, 1987: 74), and that the core objective of punishment must be evaluated in terms 
of its consequences and rationality (Burke, 2012: 149). 
As compelling as it sounds, utilitarian ideology has also been sharply criticised as lacking in the protection 
of the rights of the individual. Some core champions of ‘social utility’ dismisses the issue of rights as a 
“mischievous” maintaining that ‘rights’ are short of value in resolving ethical, social and political problems, 
because ‘rights’ are seen as impossible to construe (Easton and Piper, 2012: 128). Countering this criticism was 
the assertion that utilitarianism cannot be wholly condemned as a concept that opposes rights, in as much as we 
understand that rights promote utility (Baggarric, 2001). 
Attempting to find an alternative approach for both the retributivist and utilitarian ideals, Braithwaite and 
Petit (1993) formulated a new theory based on what they term as the ‘consequential theory of justice’. According 
to this theory, punishment should be meant to serve some future objective but unlike traditional utilitarianism, 
the individual is to be regarded as a ‘person’ and not as a means of achieving some wider objective. Von Hirch 
however dismisses this theory, arguing that its propositions are even more complicated than the traditional 
utilitarianism, because it makes it even harder to devise a scale of punishment (von Hirch,2005 cited in Easton 
and Piper, 2012: 129). 
It is obvious however that both theories do not oppose the operation of punishment as a tool in justice 
administration; they only diverge on the questions of form, purpose and consequence. Looking at the practical 
penal practices of legal regimes across the world, it is noticeable that both the utilitarian objectives and the 
retributivist goal have co-existed simultaneously, whereas it is their relevance in both law and practice that keeps 
changing.  
Although many of the earliest penal codes across the world were characterised by few codified laws and a 
justice system predicated on the arbitrary application of highly punitive sentences (Foucault, 1977: 3). Although 
some argue that harsh exercise of justice has declined, at least in most societies, and has been modified by rights-
based adversarity, the rule of law and other values such as reparation and rehabilitation (Zehr, 1990; Wachtel and 
McCold, 2001; Hudson, 2004). Yet, there is a growing scepticism among scholars over these new penological 
developments, even in western democracies, on the ground that the criminal justice system is witnessing a 
paradigm reversal towards retributivism (Garland, 2001; Zedner, 2004). This is seen to be a reflection of the 
decline in rehabilitative ideals, and the emergence of ‘labelling theory’ alongside the ‘victimised actor model’ of 
crime and criminal behaviour, both of which are based on the notion that treatment and intervention are more 
likely to produce rather than reduce criminal behaviour (Burke, 2012: 161).  Secondly, he argues, the increase in 
crime rates and disturbances in prisons further compound doubts about the capability of the State to tackle these 
problems and lastly the need by governments to reduce public expenditure in the administration of criminal 
justice (Ibid: 161). Commenting with regards to these types of complexities, Garland states that:  
“The modern institutions of punishment are especially prone to conflicts and tensions that tend to 
undermine their effectiveness and legitimacy as instruments of social policy. These conflicts -between 
condemnation and forgiveness, vengeance and mercy, the sanctity of the law and the humanity of 
compassion, social defence and individual rights, the urge to exclude and the dream of rehabilitation- 
set up complex, ambivalent sentiments that colour the day-to-day experience of those caught up in the 
penal relations, whether as administrators and officers, inmates and clients, or as members of the public 
in whose name penal sanctions are nowadays imposed” (1999: 2). 
While punishment is still a common phenomenon in almost every criminal justice regime, it is yet to 
establish that it actually does deter crime or to respond to the accusation that it as a tool of repression and 
subordination used by the dominant class to sustain power interests (Zedner, 2004: 79). The ‘diverting function’ 
theory for instance, maintains that among the many functions of punishments, particularly imprisonment, is a 
class-based alienation and containment of a particular group or section of the society, because it mainly focuses 
on narrow band of offences such as personal violence and petty property offences ignoring other greater social 
offences that often emanate from the act powerful individuals and corporations (Cavadinho and Dignan, 1997).  
 
6.0 Conclusion 
Practical trajectories of criminal justice in contemporary society have significantly redefined the nature and 
characteristic of crime control, due process and penal justice. Evidently, ideas such as rehabilitation no longer 
possess great relevance in criminal justice policies. Instead, criminal justice ideals are now focused more on 
containment and on depicting offenders as a culpable individual deserving of punishment. The series of reforms 
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occurring in the institution of criminal justice are essentially leading to far reaching changes in the nature and 
narratives of what and how to deal with crimes and offenders.  The deep gravitation towards control and penal 
populism poses the danger that crimes can be convicted without sufficient mens rea. Hence, even genuine 
culpability becomes hard to determine.   
One of the complex transformation in criminal justice is the expansion of private actor participation. The 
advent of private prisons, private surveillance and even parole officers has tremendously diluted the institution of 
criminal justice to the point that the system becomes commodified by profit-oriented partners and driven by 
economic way of thinking, which risks degenerating into a ridiculous system where crime will essentially be 
seen as not only a danger to the society but also a means of profit. This fragile process in which the orthodox role 
of the State is shared with private actors is a model that diminishes confidence on the neutrality and fairness of 
criminal justice. Displacing the core state agencies such as the police from crime prevention and protection of 
the citizenry is both a controversial and delicate contour that raises more questions on the legitimacy of the state 
and also shakes the very foundation of the idea of social contract. It also creates a tension on whether criminal 
justice strategies will, henceforth allow for fair and transparent exercise of powers. 
 
References 
1. Ashworth, A. (1998). The Criminal process: an evaluative study. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
2. Ashworth, A. (1998). The Impact on Criminal Justice,  in B. Markensis (Ed.) The Impact of the Human 
Rights Bill on English Law. 
3. Ashworth, A. (2010). Sentencing and Criminal Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
4. Bayley, D. (2001). ‘Security and Justice for All’, in H. Strang and J. Braithwaite (Eds.), Restorative Justice 
and Civil Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
5. Bottoms, A. E., and McClean J. D. (1976). Defendants in the Criminal Process. Routledge. 
6. Burke, R. H. (2011). Criminal Justice Theory: An Introduction. Routledge. 
7. Cavadinho, M., and Dignan, J. (1997). Reparation, Retribution and Rights, International Review of 
Victimology, 4, 233-253. 
8. Easton, S., and Piper, C. (2012). Sentencing and Punishment: The Quest for Justice. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
9. Feeley, M. M., (1979). Perspectives on plea bargaining. Law and Society Review. 13(2), 199-209. 
10. Feeley, M., and Simmons, J. (1994). Actuarial Justice: The emerging New Criminal Law, in Nelken, D., 
(Ed.) Futures of Criminology. London: Sage. 
11. Foucault, M. (1977).  Discipline and Punish. London: Allen Lane. 
12. Garland, D. (1999), Editorial: Punishment and Society Today. Punishment and Society,  5-10. 
13. Garland, D. (2001). The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
14. Golding, M. P. (1974). Philosophy of Law. Prentice-Hall. 
15. Klockars, C. B., and Mastrofski, S. (1991). Thinking about Police. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
16. McBarnet, D. J. (1985). Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction of Justice. London: Macmillan 
Publishers. 
17. McConville, M. (1998). Plea Bargainings: Ethics and Politics. Journal of Law and Society, 25(4), 562–587. 
18. McConville, M., and Mirsky, C. L. (2005). Jury Trials and Plea Bargaining: A True History, Portland: Hart 
Publication. 
19. Samaha, J. (2005). Criminal Justice with Infotrac. Cengage Learning. 
20. Sanders, A., and Young, R. P. (1994). Criminal Justice. Butterworths. 
21. Sanders, A., Hoyle, C., Morgan, R. And Cape, E. (2001). Victim Impact Statements: Can’t Work, Won’t 
Work. Criminal Law Review, pp. 447–458. 
22. Sanders, A., Young, R., and Burton, M. (2010). Criminal Justice (4th ed.). Oxford University Press. 
23. Shapiro, M. (1986). Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis. University of Chicago Press. 
24. Siegel, L. J. (2009). Introduction to Criminal Justice. Cengage Learning. 
25. Uglow, S., Dickson, L., Cheney, D., and Doolin, K. (2002). Criminal justice. London: Sweet and Maxwell. 
26. Von Hirsch, A. (1993). Censure and Sanctions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
27. Zedner, L. (2004). Criminal Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
28. Zedner, L. (2006). Policing Before and After the Police the Historical Antecedents of Contemporary Crime 
Control. British Journal of criminology, 46(1), 78-96. 
 
 
 
